Supplemental Brief of Professors Anthony J. Bellia Jr. and Bradford R. Clark as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents by Bellia, Anthony J. & Clark, Bradford R.
Notre Dame Law School
NDLScholarship
U. S. Supreme Court Briefs Faculty Scholarship
8-2012
Supplemental Brief of Professors Anthony J. Bellia
Jr. and Bradford R. Clark as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents
Anthony J. Bellia
Notre Dame Law School, anthony.j.bellia.3@nd.edu
Bradford R. Clark
George Washington University Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/sct_briefs
Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in U. S. Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Supplemental Brief of Professors Anthony J. Bellia Jr. and Bradford R. Clark as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S.Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491).
 No. 10-1491 
In the Supreme Court of the United States  
__________ 
 
ESTHER KIOBEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER 
LATE HUSBAND, DR. BARINEM KIOBEL, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
v. 
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO., ET AL., RESPONDENTS 
 
__________ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF PROFESSORS  
ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. AND BRADFORD R. CLARK 
AS AMICI CURIAE  IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS 
__________ 
 
 
 
 
CHRISTOPHER J. PAOLELLA 
    Counsel of Record 
 J. DAVID REICH 
 Reich & Paolella LLP 
 140 Broadway, 46th Floor 
 New York, NY 10005 
 (212) 804-7090 
cpaolella@reichpaolella.com 
 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Introduction and Interest of Amici Curiae  .................. 1 
Summary of Argument ..................................................... 3 
Argument ........................................................................... 8 
 I. The History Of The ATS Demonstrates  
 That It Was Understood to Apply Only  
 To Suits By Aliens Against United States  
 Citizens, And Not To Suits Between Aliens ............ 8 
 A. The ATS was intended to redress 
   violations of the law of nations  
  committed by United States citizens  
  against aliens ..................................................... 8 
 B. The ATS was not intended to cover  
  lawsuits by aliens against other aliens .......... 16 
II. The Limits Of Article III Diversity  
 Jurisdiction Preclude Applying The  
 ATS To Suits Between Aliens ................................. 22 
 A. Suits between aliens are outside the 
   scope of the foreign diversity  
  clause ................................................................ 23 
 B. Suits under the ATS do not arise under  
  the ―Laws of the United States‖ .................... 24 
III. This Case Is The Proper Vehicle For  
 Deciding Whether The ATS Covers  
 Suits Between Aliens ............................................... 29 
Conclusion ........................................................................ 32 
 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
Cases 
American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,  
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) ............................................ 28 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,  
546 U.S. 500 (2006) ........................................................ 31 
Bolchos v. Darrel,  
3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) .......................................... 19 
Caperton v. Bowyer,  
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216 (1871) ........................................ 27 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,  
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) .......................................... 26 
Hagans v. Lavine,  
415 U.S. 528 (1974) ........................................................ 30 
Hodgson v. Browerbank,  
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809) ........................................ 24 
Ker v. Illinois,  
119 U.S. 436 (1886) ........................................................ 28 
Molony v. Dows,  
8 Abb. Pr. 316 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pleas 1859) ................. 18 
Montalet v. Murray,  
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46 (1807) .......................................... 24 
Mossman v. Higginson,  
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800) ......................................... 23, 24 
Mostyn v. Fabrigas,  
98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774) ..................................... 18 
Moxon v. The Fanny, 
17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) ......................................... 19 
iii 
Mwani v. United States, 
No. 99-125 (JMF), 2012 WL 78237  
(D.D.C. Jan 10, 2012) .................................................... 31 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren,  
92 U.S. 286 (1875).......................................................... 27 
Respublica v. De Longchamps,  
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Pa. Ct. Oyer &  
Terminer 1784) .............................................................. 11 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,  
671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ...7, 26, 27, 28, 31 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,  
542 U.S. 692 (2004) ................................................passim 
The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh,  
53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852) ........................................ 26 
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,  
383 U.S. 715 (1966) ........................................................ 30 
Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,  
461 U.S. 480 (1983) .................................................. 24, 26 
Vernor v. Elvies,  
6 Dict. of Dec. 4788 (1610) (Scot.) ................................ 18 
Statutes 
Act of April 30, 1790,  
1 Stat. 112 ...................................................................... 15 
Judiciary Act of 1789,  
1 Stat. 73 ................................................................passim 
Process Act of 1789,  
1 Stat. 93 .............................................................. 6, 20, 25 
Process Act of 1792, 
1 Stat. 276 ...................................................................... 20 
28 U.S.C. § 1332 ............................................................... 31 
iv 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 .......................................................passim 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(A) .......................................................... 30 
Miscellaneous 
Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The 
Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations,  
78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 445 (2011) ...............................passim 
Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The 
Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1 (2009) ................................................. 12, 27, 28 
4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law 
of England (1765) ......................................................... 10 
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and 
Article III, 42 Va. J. Int‘l L. 587 (2002) ...................... 27 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Custom-
ary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 
Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997) .............................................. 27 
21 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–
1789 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1912) ...................................... 12   
34 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–
1789 (Roscoe R. Hill ed. 1937) ..................................... 11 
Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the 
Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 830 
(2006) .............................................................................. 13 
1 Op. Att‘y Gen. 57 (July 6, 1795) (William Brad-
ford) .......................................................................... 21, 22 
1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) ........................................... 12 
1 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations  
(1759) .............................................................. 9, 10, 17, 18 
v 
Oscar Zeichner, The Loyalist Problem in New 
York after the Revolution, 21 N.Y. Hist. 284 
(1940) .............................................................................. 11 
  
INTRODUCTION AND 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1 
This Court has requested supplemental briefing on 
―[w]hether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort 
Statute (‗ATS‘), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recog-
nize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than 
the United States.‖  The answer is that courts may hear 
such actions when—and only when—they are brought 
against U.S. citizens.   
As this Court recognized in Sosa, ―the ATS is a juris-
dictional statute creating no new causes of action.‖  Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).  The First 
Congress enacted the ATS pursuant to Article III‘s grant 
of foreign diversity jurisdiction (over controversies be-
tween U.S. citizens and foreign citizens) to satisfy the 
United States‘ obligation under the law of nations to re-
dress certain torts by Americans against aliens.  Properly 
understood, the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that ap-
plies only to suits by aliens against U.S. citizens.  Because 
all of the parties to this case—whether individuals or cor-
porations—are aliens, federal courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction under both the ATS and Article III.  This 
provides an independently dispositive, threshold reason 
to affirm the Second Circuit‘s dismissal of petitioners‘ 
claims. 
Congress enacted the ATS to redress injuries to al-
iens inflicted by American citizens—through ordinary 
torts involving injury to the alien‘s person or personal 
                                                 
1
  No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no person, other than the amici and their counsel, contributed mon-
ey to its preparation or submission.  The parties have consented to 
this filing. 
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property.  Such torts violated the law of nations as un-
derstood in 1789, and the law of nations obligated the 
United States to redress them.  If it failed to do so, the 
United States would have become an accomplice to its cit-
izens‘ wrongdoing and subjected itself to reprisals by for-
eign nations.  The First Congress enacted the ATS to 
provide a federal forum for alien tort claims against 
American citizens, thereby fulfilling the United States‘ 
obligation to redress such harms.  It did not enact the 
statute to resolve disputes between non-citizens—even if 
they happened to touch on matters that, today, might be 
considered violations of modern international law. 
In 1789, most torts capable of triggering jurisdiction 
under the ATS would have occurred on U.S. soil.  It 
would be a mistake, however, to say that the ATS could 
never apply ―extraterritorially‖ to injuries inflicted by 
Americans abroad.  The ATS is not a prescriptive regula-
tion subject to extraterritoriality analysis.  It is simply a 
jurisdictional statute.  Courts routinely apply jurisdic-
tional statutes to hear tort and other claims arising 
abroad.  When, for example, federal courts hear actions 
arising abroad under the general foreign diversity stat-
ute, no one contends that they are improperly applying 
the diversity statute ―extraterritorially.‖  Like the diver-
sity statute, the ATS is purely jurisdictional and presents 
no question of whether U.S. substantive law should gov-
ern conduct abroad. 
The key limitation on ATS jurisdiction was not that 
the action had to arise in U.S. territory, but that the ac-
tion had to be against a U.S. citizen.  In 1789, the United 
States was a small nation surrounded by European pow-
ers, territorial borders were uncertain and disputed, and 
violence across borders threatened the security of the 
new nation.  Under the law of nations, the United States 
had an obligation to redress violence by U.S. citizens 
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against foreigners regardless of whether it occurred 
within or outside U.S. territory.  
Amici are law professors who, prior to the Court‘s 
grant of certiorari in this case, spent several years con-
ducting scholarly research into the original meaning of 
the ATS.  Anthony J. Bellia Jr. is a Professor of Law and 
Concurrent Professor of Political Science at the Universi-
ty of Notre Dame.  Bradford R. Clark is the William 
Cranch Professor of Law at The George Washington 
University Law School.  Both teach and write in the are-
as of federal jurisdiction, constitutional law, and foreign 
relations.  Together, they have published important 
scholarship that sheds new light on the history and mean-
ing of the ATS.  Their comprehensive article, The Alien 
Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
445 (2011) (hereafter Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute), 
has been cited by the parties and amici in this case, as 
well as by lower courts construing the statute.  Profes-
sors Bellia and Clark submit this brief to share their his-
torical research and findings with the Court.   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I.  In Sosa, this Court made clear that the ATS 
should be construed according to the understanding of 
the First Congress.  The ATS, as originally understood, 
extended federal court jurisdiction to suits by aliens 
against U.S. citizens for intentional torts involving force 
against their person or personal property.  Such torts vio-
lated the law of nations and required the United States to 
redress the harm or become responsible for the violation.  
Because the ATS is solely a jurisdictional statute, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply.  
The ATS did not confer, however, jurisdiction over ac-
tions by one alien against another, regardless of where 
the tort occurred.   
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In 1789, the United States was a weak nation seeking 
to avoid conflict with foreign powers.  At the time, the law 
of nations required a nation whose citizen committed an 
intentional tort of force against a friendly alien to redress 
the injury in one of three ways: by criminal prosecution, 
by extradition, or by providing a civil remedy.  The fail-
ure to redress a tort in violation of the law of nations gave 
the offended nation just cause for war.  Americans com-
mitted numerous acts of violence against aliens immedi-
ately following the War of Independence.  The states 
proved unable or unwilling to redress such violence, leav-
ing the United States responsible and vulnerable to re-
prisals. 
As a consequence, the Founders authorized federal 
jurisdiction over several categories of cases likely to im-
plicate the law of nations.  The First Congress enacted 
criminal and civil statutes to redress harms inflicted by 
American citizens against diplomats and other foreign-
ers, and gave federal courts jurisdiction over cases in-
volving ambassadors and admiralty matters, as well as 
diversity cases involving an alien where the claim exceed-
ed $500.  Had Congress stopped there, however, the 
amount-in-controversy requirement would have denied 
ordinary aliens who suffered intentional harms at the 
hands of Americans access to federal court.  The United 
States‘ consequent responsibility for such harms would 
have subjected the weak and embryonic nation to repris-
als or wars that it could ill afford. 
The ATS filled this gap by extending federal jurisdic-
tion to ―all cases where an alien sues for a tort only in vio-
lation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States,‖ without regard to the amount in controversy.  
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77.  The ATS op-
erated as a fail-safe provision: It permitted foreign na-
tionals to sue American citizens in federal court for torts 
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that, if not redressed, would provide other countries with 
a casus belli against the United States.  By authorizing a 
self-executing method of civil redress in federal court, the 
United States avoided military reprisals for the miscon-
duct of its citizens and signaled its intent to comply with 
its obligations under the law of nations. 
The First Congress had no similar incentive to au-
thorize federal courts to adjudicate tort suits between al-
iens.  Unlike violence against aliens by American citizens, 
violence by aliens against other aliens was not imputed to 
the United States under the law of nations.  Indeed, if a 
claim between aliens arose outside the United States, ad-
judication by federal courts could have interfered with 
the territorial sovereignty of other nations—itself a viola-
tion of the law of nations.  Reading the ATS to authorize 
suits between aliens in federal court—especially where, 
as here, the conduct occurred on foreign soil—would un-
dermine the statute‘s objectives by impinging on the ter-
ritorial sovereignty of other nations and risking serious 
foreign relations consequences. 
II.  The original meaning of the ATS is consistent 
with Article III‘s limits on the federal judicial power.  In 
arguing over extraterritoriality, the parties erroneously 
assume that the ATS created a federal rule of decision.  
The ATS, however, ―is a jurisdictional statute creating no 
new causes of action.‖  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.  This juris-
dictional statute was ―enacted on the understanding that 
the common law would provide a cause of action,‖ id., and 
in 1789 Congress specifically directed federal courts to 
apply state common law.  Accordingly, the ATS provides 
no basis for ―arising under‖ jurisdiction, and can only 
plausibly be understood as a jurisdictional grant pursu-
ant to Article III‘s foreign diversity clause.  Such juris-
diction requires that at least one party to the case be a 
U.S. citizen; it provides no authority to hear suits be-
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tween aliens.  This reading of the ATS avoids many of the 
concerns raised by the Court in Sosa in connection with 
with an expansive reading of the statute. 
Both historical evidence and this Court‘s precedent 
make clear that constitutional authorization for the ATS 
must be found in the foreign diversity clause.  This Court 
has never considered the ―law of nations‖ to qualify, in 
and of itself, as federal law.  Rather, when the ATS was 
enacted, the law of nations was understood to be either 
general law or part of the common law received by the 
states.  Nor did the ATS itself create a new body of sub-
stantive federal law capable of supporting ―arising un-
der‖ jurisdiction.  Plaintiffs invoking ATS jurisdiction 
looked to other sources of law to find the cause of action 
and governing rules of decision—specifically, the Process 
Act of 1789 and section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
which instructed federal courts to apply the procedural 
and substantive common law of the state in which they 
sat.  State law does not support ―arising under‖ jurisdic-
tion.   
III.  This case is the proper vehicle for deciding 
whether the ATS covers cases solely between aliens. Sosa 
did not address this question and does not foreclose a 
holding that the ATS extends only to suits against U.S. 
citizens.  The Court did not consider or decide whether 
the statute confers, or Article III permits, jurisdiction 
over suits between aliens.  A court‘s mere assumption of 
jurisdiction without discussion has never been entitled to 
precedential effect.  Moreover, because Sosa originally 
included claims against U.S. defendants, federal courts 
had supplemental jurisdiction over related claims be-
tween aliens. 
The Sosa Court‘s dispositive holding that the plaintiff 
had not alleged a tort ―in violation of the law of nations‖ 
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within the meaning of the statute obviated the need to 
examine party-alignment limitations on subject matter 
jurisdiction.   Moreover, the Court stressed that ATS ju-
risdiction ―should be undertaken, if at all, with great cau-
tion‖ over suits that ―claim a limit on the power of foreign 
governments over their own citizens‖ and that seek ―to 
hold that a foreign government or its agent has trans-
gressed those limits.‖  542 U.S. at 727–28.   
This case squarely presents the question whether 
ATS jurisdiction extends to claims solely between aliens.  
The plaintiffs and defendants are all aliens; no U.S. citi-
zen or corporation has ever been a party to the case.  Be-
cause the issue of party alignment under the ATS is a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction, the parties cannot 
waive it, and either the Court or a party may raise it any-
time.  And the question whether the ATS covers suits be-
tween aliens is likely to recur; indeed, the issue is square-
ly presented by the Ninth Circuit‘s recent ruling in Sarei 
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), 
which this Court has held pending disposition of this case. 
If the Court decides that the ATS does not confer ju-
risdiction over suits between aliens, then it will likely 
never have to decide the question of corporate liability 
under the statute.  Today, unlike in 1789, suits by aliens 
against U.S. defendants can easily satisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement for foreign diversity jurisdic-
tion.  Because almost all lawsuits against U.S. corpora-
tions would fall within such jurisdiction, foreign plaintiffs 
would almost never have to rely on the ATS. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The History Of The ATS Demonstrates That It 
Was Understood to Confer Jurisdiction Only Over 
Suits By Aliens Against United States Citizens, 
And Not Over Suits Between Aliens. 
Recovering the original meaning of the ATS requires 
an examination of the legal and historical context in 
which it was enacted.  As enacted in 1789, the ATS pro-
vided that ―the district courts * * * shall [] have cogni-
zance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or 
the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where 
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States.‖  Judiciary Act of 
1789, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77.  The statute‘s text specifies 
that the plaintiff must be an alien, but does not mention 
the defendant‘s nationality.  Nevertheless, read in light of 
the diplomatic concerns faced by the First Congress and 
the background law of nations principles that give mean-
ing to its text, the statute confers jurisdiction only over 
lawsuits by aliens against American citizens for torts in 
violation of the law of nations.  Such lawsuits were most 
likely to involve conduct that occurred within the United 
States, but the ATS also granted jurisdiction over law-
suits involving torts of violence by U.S. citizens that oc-
curred abroad.  Because the ATS is solely a jurisdictional 
statute, the presumption against extraterritoriality does 
not apply.   
A. The ATS was intended to redress violations of 
the law of nations committed by United States 
citizens against aliens. 
1.  ―In 1789, every nation had a duty to redress cer-
tain violations of the law of nations committed by its citi-
zens or subjects against other nations or their citizens.‖   
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 448.  Such violations 
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included interfering with the rights of ambassadors, vio-
lating safe conducts, and impeding neutral use of the high 
seas.  They also included private intentional torts against 
the person or personal property of a citizen of a friendly 
nation.  Ibid.  Failure to provide redress for such miscon-
duct by a citizen against a foreign citizen—whether 
through criminal punishment, extradition, or civil liabil-
ity—provided the offended nation with just cause for war.  
The ATS was enacted to remedy this kind of private mis-
conduct against ordinary aliens. 
As Emmerich de Vattel, the most cited authority on 
the law of nations during the Founding period, explained:  
[T]he nation or sovereign, ought not to suffer the 
citizens to do an injury to the subjects of another 
state, much less to offend the state itself.  And 
that not only because no sovereign ought to per-
mit those who are under his command to violate 
the precepts of the law of nature, which forbids 
all injuries; but also because nations ought mutu-
ally to respect each other, to abstain from all of-
fense, from all abuse, from all injury, and, in a 
word, from every things that may be of prejudice 
to others. 
1 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations 144 (1759).   
 A nation that approved or ratified an injury by one of 
its citizens against an alien, either by authorizing it or—
critically—by failing to redress it after the fact, could be 
held responsible for that injury: ―The sovereign who re-
fuses to cause a reparation to be made of the damage 
caused by his subject, or to punish the guilty, or, in short, 
to deliver him up, renders himself in some measure an 
accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it.‖  
Id. at 145. 
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 This obligation applied whether the injury was inflict-
ed at home or abroad.  Ibid.  A nation could redress an in-
jury that its citizen inflicted upon a foreigner abroad by 
extraditing the offender to the nation where the offense 
occurred.  Or it could allow the injured foreigner to bring 
a transitory civil action in its own courts where the de-
fendant was domiciled.  Ibid. 
 According to Vattel, a nation‘s failure to redress inju-
ries by its citizens against foreigners through one of the-
se means violated the ―perfect rights‖ of the other na-
tionand gave it just cause for reprisals or war.  Such a 
right was ―perfect‖ because it was ―accompanied with the 
right of using force to make it observed.‖  Id. at 143.  As 
Blackstone put it, once the injured nation demanded ―sat-
isfaction and justice to be done on the offender,‖ the fail-
ure of ―the state to which he belongs‖ to provide redress 
rendered that state ―an accomplice or abettor of [its] sub-
ject‘s crimes,‖ and drew it into ―the calamities of foreign 
war.‖  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law 
of England 68 (1765); see generally Bellia & Clark, Alien 
Tort Statute 471–77. 
2.  The prospect that misconduct by U.S. citizens 
against foreigners would draw the United States into war 
was more than just a theoretical concern for the First 
Congress.  The new nation‘s survival depended on main-
taining peace with the European powers with which it 
shared its original borders.  The Founders recognized 
that ―maintaining peace required the United States to 
redress private offenses to other nations.‖  Bellia & 
Clark, Alien Tort Statute 494. 
 Under the Articles of Confederation, however, the 
newly-independent states often failed to meet their obli-
gations under the law of nations.  States committed par-
ticularly egregious violations of the law of nations by in-
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terfering with the rights of ambassadors.  For example, 
in the famous Marbois incident, a Pennsylvania state 
court convicted a French citizen of assaulting a French 
diplomat in Philadelphia, but refused to extradite the 
perpetrator as demanded by the French government.  
See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 
(Pa. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1784).  Similarly, in 1787, a 
New York city constable created an international incident 
by entering the residence of Dutch ambassador van 
Berckel with a warrant to arrest a member of his house-
hold.  The ambassador protested to John Jay, the Ameri-
can foreign affairs secretary, who reported to Congress 
that ―the foederal Government does not appear * * * to 
be vested with any judicial Powers competent to the 
Cognizance and Judgment of such Cases.‖  34 Journals 
of the Continental Congress 1774–1789 109–111 (Roscoe 
R. Hill ed. 1937).   
 Cases affecting ambassadors were important, but 
they were not the only—or most frequent—offenses dur-
ing the Confederation era.  More routine incidents in-
volved the states‘ failure to redress ordinary tort injuries 
inflicted by their own citizens on aliens: 
In the 1780s, state citizens increasingly made vio-
lent attacks upon the persons and property of 
British subjects in America.  Indeed, the presi-
dent of the Continental Congress, Elias Boudinot, 
feared that postwar acts of violence by New York 
Whigs against the British were so extreme as 
possibly to ―involve us in another War.‖ 
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 501 (quoting Oscar 
Zeichner, The Loyalist Problem in New York after the 
Revolution, 21 N.Y. Hist. 284, 289 (1940)).   
 Faced with these continuing breaches of the law of 
nations, the Continental Congress in 1781 passed a reso-
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lution imploring states to enact laws to protect foreign-
ers—and specifically to ―authorize suits * * * for damages 
by the party injured, and for compensation to the United 
States for damage sustained by them from an injury done 
to a foreign power by a citizen.‖  Bellia & Clark, Alien 
Tort Statute at 496 (quoting 21 Journals of the Continen-
tal Congress, 1774–1789 1136–37 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 
1912)).  This plea fell largely on deaf ears.  Connecticut 
was the only state to enact a civil remedy for injuries 
caused by its citizens to foreign subjects.  Id. at 504–506. 
 3.  As the Founders gathered in Philadelphia in 1787, 
one of their top priorities was to design a new constitu-
tion that would enable the United States to meet its obli-
gations under the law of nations.  Indeed, when Edmund 
Randolph opened the Federal Convention, he lamented 
the Confederation‘s inability to prevent or redress ―acts 
against a foreign power contrary to the law of nations.‖  
He concluded that the Confederation ―therefore [could 
not] prevent a war‖ and was fundamentally flawed.  1 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 24–25 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
 The Framers sought to remedy this problem not only 
by centralizing power over foreign relations in the federal 
government, but also by establishing an independent fed-
eral judiciary that could hear cases likely to implicate the 
law of nations.  Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. 
Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1, 37–46 (2009) (hereafter Bellia & Clark, Com-
mon Law of Nations).  Article III of the new Constitu-
tion extended the federal judicial power to ―Cases * * * 
arising under Treaties‖; ―Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls‖; ―Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction‖; and ―Controversies * * * be-
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.‖  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
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 In the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress gave 
the newly-established federal courts jurisdiction over im-
portant civil cases implicating the law of nations.  It 
granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over 
cases affecting ambassadors, in order to preclude state 
adjudication in cases like the Marbois and van Berckel 
incidents.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 
80–81.  It also granted the federal courts jurisdiction over 
admiralty and maritime cases, id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77, and 
suits where an alien was a party and the amount in con-
troversy exceeded $500, id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.   
 4. Had Congress stopped there, it would have left a 
significant gap: Federal courts could not have heard 
claims for personal injuries suffered by aliens at the 
hands of U.S. citizens resulting in less than $500 in dam-
ages.2  The ATS filled this gap by extending jurisdiction 
to certain tort claims by aliens with no amount in contro-
versy requirement.  ―By authorizing federal court juris-
diction over claims by ‗an alien * * * for a tort only in vio-
lation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States,‘ the First Congress ensured that the United 
States would provide aliens with at least one form of re-
dress for its citizens‘ violations of the law of nations.‖  
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 515 (quoting Judiciary 
Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. at 77).   
 The ATS‘s reference to torts ―in violation of the law of 
nations‖ thus referred to certain ordinary torts that, 
when committed by American citizens against aliens, 
would trigger the United States‘ duty under the law of 
                                                 
2
 At the time, most tort claims would not have satisfied the $500 
amount in controversy requirement for foreign diversity jurisdiction.  
See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort 
Statute, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 830, 900 (2006). 
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nations to provide redress or become responsible for the 
violation.  This narrow grant of diversity jurisdiction with 
no amount-in-controversy requirement was intended to 
redress any incident which, if mishandled by a state 
court, might trigger international conflict. 
 In light of this historical context, the ATS is best read 
to confer jurisdiction only over intentional tort claims by 
aliens against United States citizens.  The phrase ―a tort 
only in violation of the law of nations‖ most reasonably 
referred to an intentional injury by an American citizen 
to an alien‘s person or personal property.3  ―When US cit-
izens committed torts against such aliens, they violated 
the law of nations by threatening the peace of nations.  In 
such cases, the victim‘s nation would have expected the 
United States—in accordance with the law of nations—to 
redress the injury or become responsible itself for the vi-
olation.‖  Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 516.   
 Because the United States had few extradition trea-
ties in 1789, and because the apparatus for federal crimi-
nal prosecutions was yet to be established, the First 
Congress chose to satisfy the United States‘ obligation in 
the only remaining way permitted by the law of nations—
by giving federal courts jurisdiction to provide civil rem-
                                                 
3
 Commentators like Blackstone and Vattel distinguished between 
forceful, violent misconduct, such as battery and false imprisonment, 
and private wrongs committed without force, such as slander.  Bellia 
& Clark, Alien Tort Statute 517.  Because only the former were con-
sidered ―violations of the peace‖ giving rise to a duty of redress, ―‗a 
tort in violation of the law of nations‘ most reasonably would have 
been understood to mean an intentional act of force against an alien‘s 
person or property that subjected the transgressor‘s nation to justi-
fied retaliation under the law of nations if it failed to provide appro-
priate redress.‖  Ibid. 
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edies to aliens without regard to the amount in contro-
versy. 
 5.  This reading of the phrase ―a tort only in violation 
of the law of nations‖ is both broader and narrower than 
that put forward in Sosa, where this Court concluded that 
the ATS encompassed a narrow class of intentional torts 
closely analogous to the three international crimes rec-
ognized by Blackstone—violation of safe conducts, in-
fringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.  542 
U.S. at 724. 
 To be sure, the three Blackstone crimes were im-
portant means by which England sought to comply with 
its various obligations under the law of nations.  The 
First Congress likewise criminalized the three offenses 
Blackstone identified.  Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 112.  
The ATS, however, was designed to provide a civil forum 
to satisfy a distinct obligation:  to redress violence com-
mitted by Americans against ordinary foreigners.  Eng-
lish courts used their common law jurisdiction to redress 
such torts in violation of the law of nations committed by 
British subjects.  The states received the common law, 
but bias against aliens prevented state courts from suffi-
ciently redressing torts of this kind.  The First Congress 
enacted the ATS in order to give federal courts the ability 
to do so.  See generally Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 
477–84, 510–24. 
 In another sense, our reading of the ATS is narrower 
than that put forward in Sosa.  If torts corresponding to 
the three Blackstone offenses included claims by one al-
ien against another, then they would fall outside the ju-
risdiction conferred by the ATS (although they might fall 
within admiralty or ambassadorial jurisdiction).  Because 
the United States was responsible only for certain torts 
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committed by U.S. citizens against aliens, jurisdiction 
under the ATS was limited accordingly. 
B. The ATS was not intended to cover lawsuits by 
aliens against other aliens. 
1.  Understood in its original context, the language of 
the ATS did not encompass claims between aliens, be-
cause such claims did not involve ―violation[s] of the law 
of nations‖ from the perspective of the United States.  
The First Congress used that phrase to refer to wrongs 
by the United States or its citizens that triggered U.S. 
responsibility under the law of nations to provide redress 
or risk retaliation by the victim‘s nation.   
The First Congress had no reason to extend federal 
jurisdiction to tort claims between two aliens, especially 
claims arising outside the United States.  The law of na-
tions not only did not impute such torts to the United 
States; it arguably prohibited adjudication of alien-alien 
tort claims arising abroad as an infringement on the ter-
ritorial sovereignty of other nations.  Extending the ATS 
to suits between aliens would have contradicted the First 
Congress‘s goal of minimizing diplomatic conflict. 
The law of nations as understood in 1789 did not at-
tribute to a nation a tort committed by one alien against 
another alien, even if the tort occurred within its territo-
ry.  Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 519.  Consequent-
ly, the United States did not have the same obligation to 
redress such violence as it did to redress violence by its 
own citizen.  At most, the United States had an obligation 
to provide a fair hearing for claims between aliens arising 
in the United States so as to avoid a denial of justice.  See 
id. at 476.  Adjudication of such claims in state court fully 
satisfied this obligation.  Ibid.  Whereas state courts were 
notorious for discriminating against aliens when they 
sued Americans, there is no evidence that states failed to 
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adjudicate suits between aliens fairly or that foreign na-
tions raised any objections in diplomatic discussions with 
the United States.  Id. at 520.  Thus, authorizing federal 
jurisdiction over alien-versus-alien suits was both unnec-
essary and potentially dangerous. 
2.  Indeed, extending the ATS to include tort claims 
between aliens arising on foreign soil—a routine scenario 
in modern ATS cases—would affirmatively undermine 
the statute‘s original objectives.   
The law of nations imposed no obligation on the 
United States to provide aliens with a forum for adjudi-
cating claims against one another that arose in foreign 
territory.  Failure to adjudicate such claims would have 
neither placed the United States in breach of the law of 
nations nor subjected it to reprisals by foreign nations.  
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 529.   
To the contrary, vesting jurisdiction in federal courts 
over claims with no connection to the United States or its 
citizens would have risked violating the territorial sover-
eignty of the nation in which the acts occurred—inviting 
the very diplomatic conflict or military reprisals that the 
ATS was designed to prevent.   
Under the law of nations, as understood by the First 
Congress, every nation had sovereign authority within its 
own territory:  
It is a manifest consequence of the liberty and in-
dependence of nations, that all have a right to be 
governed as they think proper, and that none 
have the least authority to interfere in the gov-
ernment of another state.  Of all the rights that 
can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, 
the most precious, and that which others ought 
the most scrupulously to respect, if they would 
not do it an injury. 
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1 Vattel, supra, at 138.  As a consequence, Vattel ex-
plained, a dispute arising on foreign soil should be re-
solved only by courts of the place where the action arose 
or where the defendant was domiciled.  Id. at 154. 
 Under the law of nations as understood in 1789, ―na-
tions declined to exercise jurisdiction over actions that 
were local to another nation—in other words, within that 
nation‘s exclusive territorial sovereignty.‖  Bellia & 
Clark, Alien Tort Statute 484–85.  This principle was es-
pecially important because infringing on another nation‘s 
territorial sovereignty gave that nation just cause for 
war.  Ibid.   
 English cases from this time confirmed this principle.4  
In 1859, a New York court observed that ―no case will be 
found in the whole course of English jurisprudence in 
which an action for an injury to the person, inflicted by 
one foreigner upon another in a foreign country, was ever 
held to be maintainable in an English court.‖  Molony v. 
Dows, 8 Abb. Pr. 316, 329–30 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pleas 1859). 
 In light of these background principles, construing 
the ATS to confer jurisdiction over suits between aliens 
for conduct that occurred abroad would turn the statute 
on its head.  The United States had no responsibility un-
der the law of nations to provide redress for such wrongs, 
and adjudicating foreign conflicts could infringe on the 
territorial sovereignty of other nations and provoke the 
                                                 
4
 See Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1030 (K.B. 1774) (Lord 
Mansfield opines that English courts had no jurisdiction over action 
arising abroad between foreigners); Vernor v. Elvies, 6 Dict. of Dec. 
4788 (1610) (Scot.) (Scottish court refuses to hear action between two 
Englishman arising outside Scotland).  
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very type of diplomatic conflict that the ATS was de-
signed to avoid.5 
 3.  The concern about infringing another nation‘s ter-
ritorial sovereignty did not apply to ATS jurisdiction over 
claims by aliens against U.S. citizens, even if the claims 
arose outside the United States.  ―In contrast to alien-
alien claims arising abroad, a nation‘s courts did not im-
plicate other nations‘ territorial sovereignty under the 
law of nations when they heard actions by aliens against 
their own citizens.‖  Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 
492.  Jurisdiction over such transitory actions was com-
monplace because it was difficult to obtain personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant outside his domicile.   
 Arguments against the extraterritorial application of 
the ATS start from the mistaken premise that the statute 
not only confers jurisdiction, but also creates a federal 
rule of decision to govern cases within that jurisdiction.  
But merely exercising jurisdiction over a tort case did not 
require federal courts to apply substantive federal law 
                                                 
5
 Some proponents of a broad interpretation of the ATS erroneously 
cite two early cases—Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795), 
and Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793)—as support-
ing ATS jurisdiction over cases between aliens.  Bolchos is inapposite 
because the relevant claim was by a French citizen against a U.S. cit-
izen.  Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 459.  In Moxon, the Court 
declined to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a British ship owner‘s 
claim that his ship was illegally captured by a French vessel in U.S. 
waters.  In dicta, the Court noted that the case also did not fall within 
ATS jurisdiction because ―[i]t cannot be called a suit for a tort only, 
when the property, as well as the damages for the supposed trespass, 
are sought for.‖  17 F. Cas. at 948.  It is hard to see how the court‘s 
decision not to exercise ATS jurisdiction can be taken to support 
ATS jurisdiction over suits between aliens—an issue the court nei-
ther decided nor discussed. 
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extraterritorially.  The ATS ―is a jurisdictional statute 
creating no new causes of action.‖  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.  
Pre-existing common law causes of action provided its 
remedies.  As the Court explained in Sosa, ―[t]he jurisdic-
tional grant is best read as having been enacted on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a 
cause of action for the modest number of international 
law violations with a potential for personal liability at the 
time.‖  Ibid.  Although the Court assumed that federal 
courts would apply the common law in ATS cases, it did 
not identify the precise source of such law.   
 In the Process Act of 1789, the First Congress in-
structed federal courts, in the exercise of their jurisdic-
tion, to apply ―the forms of writs and executions‖ then in 
use by state courts.  Process Act of 1789 § 2, 1 Stat. at 93–
94; see also Process Act of 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. at 276.  This 
meant that, in ATS cases, federal courts would employ 
ordinary state common law forms of action for redressing 
tort injuries—the same forms of action they used in the 
exercise of their diversity jurisdiction.  Section 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 further provided ―[t]hat the laws of 
the several states * * * shall be regarded as rules of deci-
sion in trials at common law in the courts of the United 
States in cases where they apply.‖  Judiciary Act of 1789, 
§ 34, 1 Stat. at 92.  These provisions required a federal 
court exercising jurisdiction under the ATS to apply the 
common law of the state in which it sat to redress claims 
by aliens for torts in violation of the law of nations.   
 Similarly, exercising jurisdiction over a foreign diver-
sity case that arose abroad did not require a federal court 
to apply American law extraterritorially.  In 1789, the 
place where the defendant was domiciled was often the 
only place where the plaintiff could obtain personal juris-
diction.  Under well-accepted choice of law principles, 
federal and state courts adjudicating transitory torts 
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would have applied local forms of proceeding, but the 
substantive law of the place where the tort was commit-
ted. 
 The general presumption against extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. law began as a way of respecting the law 
of nations by preventing intrusions on the territorial sov-
ereignty of foreign states.  The same respect for the law 
of nations not only permitted, but required, the United 
States to redress injuries inflicted by its citizens against 
aliens outside the United States.  Opening federal courts 
to aliens injured by Americans abroad ensured that the 
United States would comply with its obligation under the 
law of nations to redress such injuries. 
An early opinion by Attorney General William Brad-
ford confirms this understanding.  In 1794, American citi-
zens joined a French fleet in attacking the British Sierra 
Leone Company‘s colony on the coast of Africa.  1 Op. 
Att‘y Gen. 57, 58 (July 6, 1795) (William Bradford).  Brad-
ford concluded that because the acts took place outside 
the United States, the actors could not be criminally 
―prosecuted or punished for them by the United States.‖ 
Ibid.6  Hence, ATS jurisdiction was crucial if the United 
States was to redress such injuries.  Bradford explained:  
there can be no doubt that the company or indi-
viduals who have been injured by these acts of 
hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the 
courts of the United States; jurisdiction being ex-
pressly given to these courts in all cases where an 
                                                 
6
 At the time, the law of nations prohibited countries from extending 
their criminal jurisdiction to offenses that occurred within the terri-
tory of another nation.  See Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 482–
83. 
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alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of 
nations, or a treaty of the United States. 
Id. at 59. 
 When the ATS was enacted, violence by U.S. citizens 
in nearby borderlands—such as British Canada or Span-
ish territory adjacent to the Mississippi—was of more 
immediate concern than acts across the ocean.  Bellia & 
Clark, Alien Tort Statute 501-03.  Nonetheless, for hos-
tile acts committed by U.S. citizens in any foreign terri-
tory, the ATS often provided the only reliable means for 
the United States to redress the injury and discharge its 
responsibility under the law of nations. 
II. The Limits Of Article III Diversity Jurisdiction 
Preclude Applying The ATS To Suits Between Al-
iens.  
During the first oral argument in this case, Justice 
Alito asked a simple, but essential, question: ―[W]hat‘s 
the constitutional basis for a lawsuit like this, where an 
alien is suing an alien?‖  Tr. at 51:13–15. The answer is 
just as simple, and it is dispositive: There is no constitu-
tional basis for applying the ATS to suits between aliens.  
Article III‘s authorization of foreign diversity jurisdiction 
does not extend to controversies between aliens, and the 
ATS is properly understood as a limited grant of diversi-
ty jurisdiction to hear certain claims by aliens against 
Americans.  The ATS did not create or incorporate any 
substantive cause of action as a matter of federal law.  
Thus, there is no ―arising under‖ jurisdiction over suits 
brought under the ATS for violations of the law of na-
tions. 
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A. Suits between aliens are outside the scope of 
the foreign diversity clause. 
Article III‘s foreign diversity clause authorizes fed-
eral court jurisdiction over ―Controversies * * * between 
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.‖  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  While 
controversies between U.S. citizens and foreign nationals 
fall squarely within this jurisdictional grant, disputes be-
tween or among aliens do not.  See generally Bellia & 
Clark, Alien Tort Statute 526–528.   
Although this Court has not yet addressed whether 
the ATS should be construed to include suits between al-
iens, it early on addressed the parallel issue raised by the 
general alien diversity provision.  Its resolution of this is-
sue is especially probative because both jurisdictional 
provisions were enacted together in the First Judiciary 
Act.  Section 11 of the Act conferred federal jurisdiction 
over suits ―where the matter in dispute exceeds * * * five 
hundred dollars, and * * * an alien is a party.‖  Judiciary 
Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.  Although that language—
like the language of the ATS—did not expressly exclude 
suits between two aliens, federal courts interpreted the 
provision to exclude such suits. 
In Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800), 
this Court held that Section 11 must be read narrowly in 
light of Article III: 
[T]he 11th section of the judiciary act can, and 
must, receive a construction, consistent with the 
constitution.  It says, it is true, in general terms, 
that the Circuit Court shall have cognizance of 
suits ―where an alien is a party;‖ but as the legis-
lative power of conferring jurisdiction on the fed-
eral Courts, is, in this respect, confined to suits 
between citizens and foreigners, we must so ex-
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pound the terms of the law, as to meet the case, 
―where, indeed, an alien is one party,‖ but a citi-
zen is the other. 
Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).7   
 These reasons apply equally to the ATS.  Although 
the ATS, like Section 11, does not expressly exclude suits 
between aliens, it rests on the same Article III jurisdic-
tional authorization—controversies ―between a State, or 
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or sub-
jects.‖  U.S. Const. art III, § 2 , cl. 1.  Article III provides 
no other general warrant for jurisdiction over tort claims 
between aliens—even for violations of the law of na-
tions—unless such claims have been enacted into positive 
federal law, such as by statute or treaty.  The ATS, which 
is purely ―jurisdictional,‖ Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712, is not 
such a statute. 
  ―Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts beyond the bounds established by the Con-
stitution.‖  Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 
461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983).  Because Article III‘s foreign di-
versity clause does not extend the federal judicial power 
to controversies between aliens, and because the law of 
nations only required the United States to remedy harms 
inflicted by its own citizens against aliens, the ATS is 
most naturally read—like Section 11—to confer jurisdic-
tion only over suits between aliens and U.S. citizens. 
B. Suits under the ATS do not arise under the 
“Laws of the United States.” 
 Because Article III‘s foreign diversity clause does not 
extend to suits between aliens, this Court could uphold 
                                                 
7
 See also Hodgson v. Browerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); 
Montalet v. Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46, 47 (1807). 
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jurisdiction over such suits only by concluding that they 
constitute cases ―arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority.‖  U.S. Const. art. 
III, § 2, cl. 1.  This Court held in Sosa, however, that ―the 
ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of 
action.‖ 542 U.S. at 724.  Rather, the pre-existing ―com-
mon law would provide a cause of action.‖  Id.   
 At the time the ATS was enacted, rules derived from 
the law of nations were considered a form of either gen-
eral law or state common law.  But neither form of law 
supported ―arising under‖ jurisdiction: The First Con-
gress would not have understood an alien claim ―for a tort 
only in violation of the law of nations‖ to arise under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 
   1.  In Sosa, the Court stressed that the ATS is a 
purely jurisdictional statute that creates ―no new causes 
of action.‖  See, e.g., 542 U.S. at 729  (―All Members of the 
Court agree that [the ATS] is only jurisdictional.‖).  If the 
relevant cause of action was not ―new,‖ then it would not 
have been a federal cause of action because the federal 
government only came into being with the ratification of 
the Constitution in 1789.   
 We agree that the First Congress expected federal 
courts to apply the common law to redress torts commit-
ted by Americans against aliens, but that expectation did 
not transform the common law into federal law.  To the 
contrary, the Process Act and Section 34 of the Judiciary 
Act instructed federal courts to apply the forms of pro-
ceeding used by state courts and the laws of the several 
states as rules of decision.   
 Moreover, a ―purely jurisdictional‖ statute—that is, 
one that seeks to do ―nothing more than grant jurisdic-
tion over a particular category of cases‖—does not confer 
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jurisdiction on the federal courts pursuant to the ―arising 
under clause.‖  Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496 (quoting The 
Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 
443, 451 (1852)).  ―This reasoning is obviously correct: a 
‗purely jurisdictional statute‘ granting jurisdiction over a 
particular class of cases does not make that particular 
class of cases arise under federal law any more than the 
diversity jurisdiction statute makes a $100,000 breach of 
contract suit between a Massachusetts corporation and a 
Maine citizen ‗arise under‘ federal law.‖  Sarei, 671 F.3d 
at 820 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).   
 The ATS‘s purely jurisdictional nature forecloses the 
argument that tort suits between aliens ―arise under‖ the 
jurisdictional statute itself. 
 2.   This Court should also reject any argument that 
ATS claims ―arise under‖ federal law because ―the law of 
nations‖ is part of the ―Laws of the United States.‖8  
When the ATS was enacted, the First Congress did not 
understand the law of nations to constitute federal com-
mon law:  
Federal common law is a modern construct.  Prior 
to the twentieth century, courts did not recognize 
federal rules of decision whose content cannot be 
traced by traditional methods of interpretation to 
federal statutory or constitutional commands.  To 
                                                 
8
 This erroneous approach was adopted by the Second Circuit in 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980), in which 
two citizens of Paraguay sued another Paraguayan national for tor-
turing their son in Paraguay.  As discussed below, this approach is 
anachronistic and lacks a convincing basis in the historical record.  
Moreover, none of the cases relied on in Filartiga involved questions 
of ―arising under‖ jurisdiction.  Bellia & Clark, Common Law of Na-
tions 63–75, 84–90.    
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be sure, federal courts applied certain rules de-
rived from the law of nations in the exercise of 
their Article III jurisdiction—particularly their 
admiralty and foreign diversity jurisdiction.  They 
did not apply such rules, however, because they 
constituted a form of supreme federal law. 
Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute 547–48 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bellia & 
Clark, Common Law of Nations 37–41; Curtis A. Brad-
ley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va. J. Int‘l 
L. 587, 597–616 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Gold-
smith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. 
L. Rev. 815 (1997). 
 This approach has been followed by the Supreme 
Court.  As Judge Ikuta explained in her dissent in Sarei: 
[A] series of subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
establish[ ] that cases presenting questions of in-
ternational law do not arise under the laws of the 
United States for purposes of Article III.   See 
Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 228 
(1871) (―It is said that [the plea] involves a ques-
tion of international law.  If it does, this can give 
this court no jurisdiction.  The law of nations is 
not embodied in any provision of the Constitution, 
nor in any treaty, act of Congress, or any authori-
ty, or commission derived from the United 
States.‖); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 
U.S. 286, 286–87 (1875) (holding that the court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear a case involving ―the 
general laws of war, as recognized by the law of 
nations applicable to this case,‖ because ―it [was] 
nowhere appearing that the constitution, laws, 
treaties, or executive proclamations, of the United 
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States were necessarily involved in the deci-
sion.‖); American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828) (―A case in admi-
ralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States.‖). 
671 F.3d at 823 (Ikuta, J., dissenting); see also Ker v. Il-
linois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (Supreme Court had ―no 
right to review‖ the decision of an Illinois court regarding 
―a question of common law, or the law of nations‖); Bellia 
& Clark, Common Law of Nations 39–41.   
 In short, ―[e]ven if the law of nations was considered a 
form of general common law, it was not understood to be 
supreme federal law inherently capable of either 
preempting state law or supporting ‗arising under‘ juris-
diction in federal court.‖  Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Stat-
ute 528 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).  Conse-
quently, such law cannot support federal question juris-
diction for alien-versus-alien lawsuits under the ATS. 
* * * 
 As Sosa confirmed, the ATS ―is in terms only jurisdic-
tional.‖  452 U.S. at 712.  It did not create a federal cause 
of action or adopt the law of nations as a matter of federal 
law.  Such steps were unnecessary in 1789 because diver-
sity jurisdiction was enough to give aliens a federal forum 
in which to pursue tort claims against American citizens, 
and to fully satisfy the United States‘ obligations under 
the law of nations to redress the misconduct of its citizens 
toward aliens.  Reading the ATS as an exercise of foreign 
diversity jurisdiction also accords with the reasons for 
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―great caution‖ identified by this Court in rejecting an 
expansive interpretation of the statute.9   
III. This Case Is The Proper Vehicle For Deciding 
Whether The ATS Covers Suits Between Aliens.  
1.  When Sosa reached this Court, it involved ATS 
claims only among Mexican nationals.  However, Sosa did 
not address—much less answer—whether the ATS 
grants jurisdiction over suits between aliens, or whether 
such jurisdiction comports with Article III.  That ques-
tion remains open and is ripe for decision by the Court in 
this case. 
First, the Sosa Court had no need to consider the 
question of party alignment given its conclusion that the 
plaintiff there had failed to allege a tort ―in violation of 
the law of nations‖ under the ATS.  542 U.S. at 727.   
In addition, the jurisdictional issue was not cleanly 
presented in Sosa because the district court had inde-
pendent constitutional and statutory bases for subject 
matter jurisdiction.  The court had jurisdiction over 
plaintiff‘s original claims against the United States under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act and over the claims against 
the DEA agents under the foreign diversity statute.  Be-
cause the claims against the Mexican defendant shared a 
                                                 
9
 Restricting the ATS to torts committed by U.S. citizens would min-
imize ―the potential implications for the foreign relations of the Unit-
ed States.‖ Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.  And limiting its coverage to ordi-
nary intentional torts of force—of the kind that have been recognized 
and routinely litigated for centuries—would avoid embroiling the 
courts in creating a new federal common law of ―international‖ of-
fenses.  See id. at 728 (courts ―have no congressional mandate to de-
fine new and debatable violations of the law of nations‖). 
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common nucleus of operative fact with the claims against 
the U.S. defendants, the federal courts had supplemental 
jurisdiction even after the claims against the U.S. de-
fendants were dismissed.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Unit-
ed Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 
(1966). 
In short, the Sosa Court did not decide—and had no 
need to decide—whether the ATS permits a suit between 
aliens in order to hold that the claims in that case were 
outside the scope of the statute.  This means that the 
Court is free to address—and resolve—it here.  See Ha-
gans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n.5 (―[W]hen questions 
of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub 
silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound 
when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional 
issue before us.‖). 
2.  The Sosa Court itself questioned whether certain 
alien-alien claims arising abroad ever could be brought in 
federal court under the ATS.  Specifically, it questioned 
whether ATS jurisdiction ever could extend to suits that 
―claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over 
their own citizens‖ and that seek ―to hold that a foreign 
government or its agent has transgressed those limits.‖  
542 U.S. at 727–28.  Because such suits could have ―ad-
verse foreign policy consequences,‖ the Court stressed 
that ATS jurisdiction ―should be undertaken, if at all, 
with great caution.‖  Id. at 728 (emphasis added).  
3.  Unlike Sosa, this case squarely presents the statu-
tory and constitutional questions of whether the ATS co-
vers a lawsuit solely between aliens.  The plaintiffs and 
defendants are all aliens; no American citizen or corpora-
tion has ever been a party.   
Moreover, if the Court decides that the ATS does not 
apply to suits between aliens, it is unlikely that it will ev-
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er need to resolve the question of corporate liability un-
der the statute.  Pursuant to the diversity statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1332, federal courts already have jurisdiction 
over suits by aliens against American corporations where 
the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000.  Thus, 
aliens would have to rely on the ATS only in the unlikely 
event that they were suing a U.S. corporation for less 
than $75,000.  Claims over that amount would proceed 
identically regardless of whether the claims were brought 
under the ATS or under foreign diversity jurisdiction. 
However, if the Court declines to address the subject 
matter jurisdiction issue here, the question will remain 
open and will almost certainly require resolution by this 
Court.  For example, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 
736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), an en banc panel of the 
Ninth Circuit sharply divided on this question.  Judge 
Ikuta—in a dissent joined by Judges Kleinfeld, Callahan, 
and Bea—argued that federal courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction over claims between aliens.  Id. at 818–34 
(Ikuta, J., dissenting).  Similarly, in Mwani v. United 
States, a Magistrate Judge recently stayed proceedings 
in an ATS case to await, among other things, whether Ki-
obel addresses the question of whether the ATS extends 
to claims against aliens.  No. 99-125 (JMF), 2012 WL 
78237 (D.D.C. Jan 10, 2012).  Indeed, if the Court were to 
decide here that corporations may be liable under the 
ATS, the jurisdictional question would remain open on 
remand to the Second Circuit.  See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (―The objection that a fed-
eral court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised 
by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage 
in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judg-
ment.‖) (citation omitted).  Considerations of certainty 
and judicial economy counsel in favor of resolving the 
subject matter jurisdiction issue now rather than later. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold that 
the ATS does not extend to cases between aliens and af-
firm the decision of the Second Circuit on that basis.  
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